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BASED ON A BROKERAGE AGREEMENT ENFORCEABLE UNDER THE

STATUTE OF FRAUDS-McCann v. Biss, 65 N.J. 301 (1974).

On June 19, 1971, Steven and Joan Biss executed a contract
for the sale of their home to Ernest and Elaine Wuester for
$36,900, and title was later closed.' Nell McCann, trading as Nell
McCann Realty, subsequently filed a complaint in the Bergen
County District Court, naming the Bisses and the Wuesters as
defendants. 2 Claiming that she had been the efficient cause of the
sale, McCann sued for the commission allegedly due her. 3 At trial,
the factual dispute focused upon the nature of the relationship
between the sellers and the plaintiff, the significance of the actions
of the plaintiff on behalf of the buyers or the sellers, and the legal
ramifications of the relationship between the buyers and the plain-

tiff.4 It was undisputed that there was neither a written real estate
' McCann v. Biss, 65 N.J. 301, 307, 322 A.2d 161, 164 (1974).
2 Id. at 303, 322 A.2d at 162.
3

Id.

4 See id. at 305-07, 322 A.2d at 163-64. Justice Hall, speaking for the court, noted that
the confusing and contradictory testimony made it "exceedingly difficult to determine the
full truth." Id. at 305, 322 A.2d at 163.
This is demonstrated by a summary of the events leading up to the litigation: Late in the
spring of 1971 the Bisses ran advertisements in several local newspapers for the sale of their
house in West Milford, N.J. These ads resulted in visits by a great number of prospective
buyers (some accompanied by brokers) and brokers seeking to represent the Bisses. Apparently "[tihere were so many they could not differentiate between them and they generally
did not ask who the visitors were." Id. at 303, 305, 322 A.2d at 162-63. One advertisement
was seen by plaintiff's saleswoman, who testified that she telephoned Mr. Biss and attempted
to negotiate an exclusive listing agreement, but that he would agree only to an open listing
which merely grants the broker permission to produce an acceptable buyer. This arrangement was denied by Mr. Biss. Id. at 306, 322 A.2d at 163.
The plaintiffs saleswoman further testified that she later inspected the home with Mr.
Biss and prepared a listing card quoting the asking price of $37,500 and the net price of
$35,000. Mr. Biss denied this conversation. Mrs. Wuester testified that she was shown the
house by the same saleswoman, but due to the number of visitors, the Bisses could neither
confirm nor deny that testimony. It was also alleged by the plaintiff that a few days later, her
saleswoman met with the Wuesters and that an offer was made by phone to Mr. Biss for
$37,000, which he refused. This too was denied, but it should be noted that the Wuesters
did not confirm the making of the offer or the phone call; it is not clear whether they were
asked to so testify. Id. at 306-07, 322 A.2d at 163-64.
When the saleswoman called Mr. Biss a few weeks later, she was informed that the
house had been sold, but Biss did not identify the buyers. It is not clear whether he was
asked their identity. When Mrs. Wuester was called, she falsely told the plaintiff that she and
her husband had decided to rent instead of buy. The Wuesters testified that during the
subsequent negotiations between the two parties, Mr. Biss had stated that he did not want a
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brokerage agreement signed by the Bisses, authorizing the plaintiff
to represent them in the sale of their house, nor a written notice by
the broker confirming an oral agreement, as required by section
nine of the New Jersey statute of frauds. 5 It was established at the
trial that Mrs. Wuester visited the Biss home accompanied by the
plaintiff's saleswoman; 6 that Mr. Biss knew the plaintiff was interested in representing him; 7 and that the house was purchased
by the Wuesters directly from the Bisses.8
In her suit, McCann attempted to establish liability in both
contract and tort.9 Plaintiff's allegation that the buyers had
broker involved in the transaction. In the signed contract the Wuesters represented " 'that
no broker brought about the sale of this property.' " Id. at 307, 322 A.2d at 164.
5 Id. at 306, 322 A.2d at 163. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:1-9 (1940), which provides in
pertinent part:
[N]o broker or real estate agent selling or exchanging real estate for or on account
of the owner shall be entitled to any commission for such sale or exchange, unless
his authority therefor is in writing, signed by the owner or his authorized agent, or
unless such authority is recognized in a writing or memorandum, signed by the
owner or his authorized agent, either before or after such sale or exchange has
been effected ....
Any broker or real estate agent selling or exchanging real estate pursuant to an
oral agreement with the owner of such real estate . . . may recover from such owner
the amount of commission on such sale or exchange, if the broker or agent shall,
within five days after the making of the oral agreement and prior to the actual sale
or exchange of such real estate, serve upon the owner a notice in writing, setting
forth the terms of the oral agreement ....
For a discussion of the development of statutes of frauds see notes 24-25 infra and accompanying text.
Both the plaintiff and her saleswoman knew the alleged listing agreement was not
enforceable, and admitted that they had not complied with the five-day notice requirement.
McCann v. Biss, 65 N.J. 301, 306, 322 A.2d 161, 163 (1974). Whether such an oral
agreement is void, voidable, or unenforceable has not been answered with any consistency in
New Jersey. See Harris v. Perl, 41 N.J. 455, 461, 197 A.2d 359, 363 (1964) (voidable); C. B.
Snyder Realty Co. v. Nat'l Newark & Essex Banking Co., 14 N.J. 146, 165, 101 A.2d 544,
554 (1953) (unenforceable); Louis Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 113 N.J.L. 582, 591, 175 A. 62, 68
(Ct. Err. & App. 1934) (void). The McCann court termed the alleged contract between the
broker and the sellers as both void and unenforceable. McCann v. Biss, 65 N.J. 301, 310, 322
A.2d 161, 166 (1974).
6 McCann v. Biss, 65 N.J. 301, 306, 322 A.2d 161, 164 (1974). The plaintiff admitted
that the Wuesters were not told of any agreement with the Bisses. Id. But see note 81 infra,
regarding the constructive knowledge of a prospective purchaser that the broker will receive
a commission if he is the efficient cause of a subsequent sale.
' McCann v. Biss, 65 N.J. 301, 306, 322 A.2d 161, 163 (1974). The Bisses, however,
testified that no broker had been authorized to act for them in executing the sale. The
supreme court was of the opinion that "they wished to sell the property themselves and did
not desire the services of a broker." Id. at 305, 322 A.2d at 163.
8 Id. at 307, 322 A.2d at 164.
9 Id. at 303, 322 A.2d at 162. Since there had been no compliance with the statute of
frauds, the count against the Bisses based on breach of contract was dismissed before the
trial and no appeal was taken. Id. Another count against the Bisses, in quantum meruit, was
likewise dismissed. Id. It has been held that a suit against a seller to recover for a broker's
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breached an implied contract with her to complete the transaction
was dismissed by the trial judge. 10 Claims were also brought against
the buyers and the sellers in tort alleging that they had intentionally and unjustifiably "interfered with a reasonable expectancy of
economic advantage or benefit on the part of the broker."1 1 The
latter was the only -issue decided by the jury,' 2 which found in
favor of the buyers and against the sellers and awarded the plain3
tiff approximately six percent of the selling price of the house.'
The sellers appealed the tortious interference judgment
against them, but the plaintiff did not appeal the judgment rendered in favor of the buyers on that issue. Plaintiff did, however,
cross-appeal the dismissal of the implied contract claim against the
buyer.14 The appellate division sustained the judgment in favor of
the buyers and reversed the judgment against the sellers as to
tortious interference, remanding the cause for entry of final judgment.' 5 The New Jersey supreme court granted the plaintiff's
petition for certification 6 on the question whether the absence of a
written seller-broker contract will prevent a real estate broker from
bringing an action against a seller for tortious interference with the
broker's prospective economic advantage. 1 7 Also certified was the
services rendered pursuant to an oral agreement by bringing the action in quantum meruit
is merely an attempt to evade the statute and will not be permitted. Leimbach v. Regner, 70
N.J.L. 608, 609, 57 A. 138, 138 (Sup. Ct. 1904). See 2 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 416, at 438
(1950). But cf. Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 559, 236 A.2d 843, 859 (1967)
(citing Tanner Associates, Inc. v. Ciraldo, 33 N.J. 51, 67-68, 161 A.2d 725, 734 (1960))
(authorizing quantum meruit recovery from a buyer).
10 McCann v. Biss, 65 N.J. 301, 303, 322 A.2d 161, 162 (1974). Another judge,
however, had sustained the count alleging breach of implied contract by denying a pretrial
motion for summary judgment made by the Wuesters. Id. at 312, 322 A.2d at 167.
Id. at 303, 322 A.2d at 162.
i2 Id. The court expressed its displeasure with the "hardly adequate" instructions to the
jury on the tortious interference claim, observing that the jury in McCann was not given
enough information so that it could "intelligently and correctly apply the law to the facts."
Id. at 303-04 n.1, 322 A.2d at 162.
13 Id. at 303-04, 322 A.2d at 162.
14 Id. at 304, 322 A.2d at 162.
15 McCann v. Biss, No. A-539-72, at 4-5 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., July 12, 1973).
is McCann v. Biss, 63 N.J. 582, 311 A.2d 5 (1973).
17 McCann v. Biss, 65 N.J. 301, 304, 322 A.2d 161, 163 (1974). The McCann court
noted that tortious interference is a "rather difficult tort." Id. at 303-04 n.1, 322 A.2d at 162.
As explained by one court, there are two similar but separate torts which must be distinguished. In an action based on tortious interference with a contract or an existing business
relationship, an underlying contractual expectancy must be shown, while an allegation of
interference with a prospective economic opportunity or advantage entails no such requirement. Fitt v. Schneidewind Realty Corp., 81 N.J. Super. 497, 502-03, 196 A.2d 26, 29 (L.
Div. 1963). See generally 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 6.5-.11 (1956); W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 129-30 (4th ed. 1971).
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question whether the appellate division erred in holding that no
implied broker-buyer contract existed.'"
The supreme court in McCann v. Biss"9 held that, "as a general
proposition," a real estate broker who cannot recover a commission
from a seller because of noncompliance with the statute of frauds
cannot avoid the statute by suing the seller for "wrongful interference with the broker's reasonable expectancy of economic ben-efit."' 20 It further held that, under the facts of this case, there was
no implied contract between the buyers and the broker requiring
the buyers to pay the commission if the broker could not legally
collect from the sellers. 2' As to the sellers' liability, the court
reasoned that since the "expected economic benefit" of a brokerhis commission-is normally conditioned upon the existence of a
valid written listing agreement, no action could lie for interference
with that expectation when the agreement failed because of noncompliance with the statute of frauds.2 2 As to the buyers' liability,
the implied contract theory was said to be "patently frivolous" and
These torts have usually involved interference by third parties, not by one of the parties
to the transaction. See, e.g., Schechter v. Friedman, 141 N.J. Eq. 318, 324, 57 A.2d 251, 254
(Ct. Err. & App. 1948) (distributor held liable for inducing manufacturer to breach contract
with a competitor and sell to him instead); Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N.J. Eq.
759, 760-61, 53 A. 230, 231 (Ch. 1902) (injunction granted restraining striking employees
from inducing other employees to breach their contracts with employer).
" McCann v. Biss, 65 N.J. 301, 304, 322 A.2d 161, 163 (1974).
19 65 N.J. 301, 322 A.2d 161 (1974).
20 Id. at 310, 322 A.2d at 165-66.
21 Id. at 312-13, 322 A.2d at 167.
22 Id. at 310, 322 A.2d at 166. The McCann court stated:
"(2) If a statute provides that a person employing another for a specified
purpose shall not be liable to the other for compensation although the other
renders the promised performance, unless the employer has signed a memorandum in writing, a person has no duly to pay to another whom he orally employs for
such purpose either the promised compensation or the reasonable value of services
rendered."
Comment (b) . . . is particularly pertinent:
"b. Statutes similar to the one referred to in this Subsection are not infrequently enacted with reference to contracts with real estate brokers. The
memorandum commonly required under such statutes is one which describes the
thing to be sold and the terms of compensation. In the absence of such a
memorandum, the employer, although benefited by the service of the agent who
has been orally employed by him, is under no duty to give compensation in any
form. ***

The rule stated in this Subsection differs radically from that applying to the
ordinary Statutes of Frauds. Its purpose is to protect against fraudulent claims for
services; if the broker were entitled to obtain the value of services the statute would
not have the effect intended. Brokers are professionals; it is not unfair to deprive them of
compensation ifthey do not adopt the safeguards of which they should be aware."
65 N.J. at 309-10, 322 A.2d at 165 (quoting from 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 468 (1958)) (emphasis by court).
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an overextension of a prior New Jersey decision which imposes a
broker-buyer implied contract when the buyer wrongfully fails to
23
complete his contract with the seller.
The effect of section nine of the statute of frauds, which
pertains to real estate brokerage contracts,2 4 has been the basis of
much litigation in New Jersey.2 5 It has been judicially construed to
have a twofold purpose: first, to protect sellers from fraudulent
claims for commissions by real estate brokers; and second, to prevent real estate brokers from contracting for the sale of land unless
their authority to do so has been expressed in a written instrument
26
signed by the seller or his agent.
Statutes of frauds in general have been severely criticized as
outmoded. 27 Additionally, the New Jersey statute controlling real
23

65 N.J. at 312-13, 322 A.2d at 167. See Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528,

236 A.2d 843 (1967). For a discussion of Dobbs as it relates to McCann see notes 80-84 infra
and accompanying text.
24 The section of New Jersey's statute of frauds governing real estate brokerage agreements was originally adopted in 1873, Law of March 13, 1873, ch. 215, § 1, [1873] N.J. Laws
50, revised, Law of March 27, 1874, § 10, [1874] N.J. REV. STAT. 301, and was twice
amended. The first amendment allowed a broker to recover a commission as long as a
writing was executed before or after the sale. Law of May 1, 1911, ch. 331, § 1, [1911] N.J.
Laws 703. The second amendment established the five-day notice provision. Law of March
5, 1918, ch. 273, § 1, [1918] N.J. Laws 1020-21.
25 See notes 53-74 infra and accompanying text.
Like all statutes of frauds, New Jersey's statute is based on the 1676 English statute [An
Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (1676)], which, although aimed at
frauds and perjuries generally, included specific provisions regarding the conveyance of
land, and indeed, appears to have been enacted because of the vast amount of fraud in that
area. Hawkins, Where, Why and When Was the Statute of Frauds Enacted?, 54 AM. L. REV. 867,
869 (1920). The author stated:
In fact, so many transactions of daily life were carried out without the aid of
any writing that in order to prove any debt, the ownership of land, or to substantiate the validity of many contracts by unmistakable and indisputable evidence it
became necessary to call for the testimony of eye witnesses, who had nothing to
assist their memories outside of hazy recollections and could tell the jury something
far different from the actual facts. Under such circumstances collusion, false swearing and actual fraud, perpetrated by subordination [sic] of perjury, was the general
outcome, while the plaintiff in a case would get very little for his pains.
Id. (footnote omitted).
" Sadler v. Young, 78 N.J.L. 594, 597, 75 A. 890, 891 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910). The
protections afforded to sellers, however, have on occasion been abused. For example, in
Noonan v. Henry, 97 N.J.L. 447, 117 A. 393 (Sup. Ct. 1922), the court observed:
This statute was enacted for the protection of the landowner. It, however, was
frequently used by landowners to deprive brokers of commissions which they had
rightfully earned.
Id. at 448-49, 117 A. at 394 (dictum). See generally Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel Applied to
the Statute of Frauds, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 440,- 442-43 (1931).
z' See Summers, supra note 26, at 441-42. This commentator asserted:
The purpose of the statute is quite apparent, but it must be remembered that
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estate brokerage agreements has been attacked as discriminatory,
since there are no similar 'statutory provisions regulating other
professions. 28 Despite these and other criticisms,2 9 statutes of
frauds relating to broker-seller agreements remain in force in
30
many jurisdictions.
Although under certain circumstances a broker may recover
the value of his commission from a seller on tort grounds despite
the requirements of section nine of the statute of frauds,3 ' that
statute bars recovery where the broker has grounded his claims
specifically on interference with an oral contract. In C. B. Snyder
Realty Co. v. National Newark & Essex Banking Co. ,32 the plaintiff
broker entered into negotiations with the defendant bank and a
conditions in 1677 were different from those of today. . . . [T]here is a steadily
growing opinion that the statute has outlived its usefulness and should be repealed.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Cf 3 S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 448, at 347 (3d ed. 1960),
where reference is made to the statute of frauds in general as "warped and twisted by
misconception and misapplication."
" See Lasser, Real Estate Broker's Commission--OralAgreements and the Statute of Frauds, 10
RUTGERS L. REv. 410 (1955). Professor Lasser has mounted a particularly vehement attack
on section nine of New Jersey's statute of frauds, calling it a "severe form of occupational
regulation." Id. at 410. He "[c]ompare[d] the unfortunate position of the real estate broker
with" that of the more fortunate securities broker who is "unhampered by a writing
requirement." Id. at 412. Noting the importance of mutual trust between a broker and his
client, he stated:
Often a broker will not jeopardize his relations with the owner by suggesting that
the commission agreement be in writing. When businessmen pride themselves on
their integrity and ability to conduct their business with a handshake, they are
insulted by the inference of a request that a commission agreement be reduced to
writing.
Id. The author further emphasized that an unscrupulous seller could manipulate the statute
of frauds to deprive a real estate broker of his commission:
The owner of a desirable property can induce a real estate broker to perform his
services and procure a sale. The owner may then remain behind the protective
bulwark of the Statute of Frauds where he can force a settlement with the broker at
a figure lower than the usual commission, or defeat the demand for commission
entirely.
Id. at 412-13.
29 See, e.g., Stevens, Ethics and the Statute of Frauds, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 355 (1952). In this
article Dean Stevens raised the ethical problems involved in the practical application of
statutes of frauds in litigation. Specifically, he observed that the lawyer faces a dilemma
when he knows an oral agreement exists, yet must plead the statute of frauds as a defense
for his client at the expense of an innocent party-"[c]onscience tells him that the practice is
wrong, but the literature from insurance companies reminds him of liability for malpractice." Id. at 356. The author further notes that "[t]he decisions and texts are replete with the
statement that the statute was intended to be used as a shield, not a sword." Id. at 360.
10 For a listing of those jurisdictions wherein the real estate agent's authority to act tor
the seller must be in writing see 3 S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTCRACTS § 489A (1960).
31 See text accompanying notes 42-60 infra.
32 14 N.J. 146, 101 A.2d 544 (1953).
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prospective purchaser concerning the sale of the realty of the
defendant building company, of which the bank was the majority
stockholder. 3 Subsequently, the interested parties remolded the
original proposal to sell the building company's realty into an
arrangement to transfer its stock. 3 4 The gravamen of the plaintiff's
claim was that, according to his agreement with the defendants, his
commission would be earned upon the procurement of a firm offer
for the stock, whether or not the sale was completed. 35 He obtained
a firm offer, but was informed the next day by the defendants that
a "better offer" had been received from another purchaser and
had been accepted. 3 6 The broker sued in contract and in tort for
his commission upon the ground that he had procured a purchaser
for the stock or, alternatively, that he had initially obtained the
37
prospective purchaser for the realty.
At trial, the defendants were awarded summary judgment on
all counts, and plaintiff appealed.3 8 Having granted certification,
the supreme court held that, as to the claims for commission based
on the stock transaction, material issues of fact existed, and it
reversed the grant of summary judgment.3 9 , However, as to the
plaintiff's claim that he was entitled to recover a commission for his
services relating to the originally proposed real estate deal, the
court, agreeing with the judgment below, held that plaintiff was
barred from contractual recovery because of noncompliance with
section nine. 40 Further, since the claim in tort was based on alleged
interference with that unenforceable contract, the court reasoned
that to allow the tort claim would offend the spirit of the statute of
frauds.

41

In situations where the statute of frauds is not directly in issue,
Id.

33 Id. at 151, 101 A.2d at 547. The bank owned 85% of the building company's stock.
34 Id.

15 Id. at
36 Id. at
37 Id. at
Plaintiff

153-54, 101 A.2d at 548.
151, 101 A.2d at 547.
151-52, 101 A.2d at 547.
also sought quantum meruit relief, denial of which was affirmed by the

supreme court. Id. at 152, 162-63, 101 A.2d at 547, 553.

38 Id. at 150, 101 A.2d at 546.
39 Id. at 163, 165, 101 A.2d at 553-54.
40 Id. at 161-62, 164-65, 101 A.2d at 552, 554. The court observed:
Although there are writings included in the record as exhibits, there is nothing
advanced to show compliance by the plaintiff with R. S. 25:1-9 which is the statute
of frauds relating to agreements for the payment of compensation in connection
with real estate transactions.
Id. at 161-62, 101 A.2d at 552.
41 Id. at 164-65, 101 A.2d at 554.
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claims by real estate brokers based on tortious interference with
their lawful business pursuits have been sustained. Louis Kamm, Inc.
v. Flink4 2 is representative of such situations. There, the plaintiff
broker had brought an action against the president of a building
and loan association (the seller) and two other brokers, all of whom
43
allegedly were responsible for depriving him of his commission.
That portion of the action grounded in tortious interference alleged three wrongs: that after the plaintiff had confidentially disclosed to the president the identity of a prospective purchaser, the
defendants acted in concert to induce the association to exclude the
plaintiff from further negotiations; 44 that the defendants stole the
plaintiffs customer; and that they " 'unlawfully, improperly and
maliciously interfered with plaintiffs relation with'" the prospective
buyer. 45 The Court of Errors and Appeals 46 held that, even in

the absence of a "formal contractual relationship" between the
broker and the association, 4 7 the action for unjustifiable interference with the business pursuits of the plaintiff did state a valid
cause of action in tort.4 8 The alleged acts of the defendants were
viewed as an infringement upon the plaintiffs property right to
pursue a business, and the court declared that "natural justice"
would require a remedy in such circumstances. 4 " Discerning overtones of "sharp dealing" by the defendants, the court noted that
the allegations permitted an inference that the president of the
association sought to gain a pecuniary advantage from his interference and that such motive evidenced malice.5 0
It is important to note that, although the president appears to
have had the agency power to act for the association, 5 ' the latter
42

43

113 N.J.L. 582, 175 A. 62 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934).
Id. at 583-84, 175 A. at 64-65.

44 Id.
41 Id.

at 584, 175 A. at 65. One of the other brokers was the president's brother-in-law,
and it was his firm which eventually received the commission from the subsequent sale of the
property. Id. at 583-84, 175 A. at 64-65.
46 The complaint had been dismissed by the Essex County circuit court as a sham and
was brought on appeal to the Court of Errors and Appeals. Id. at 583, 175 A. at 64.
41 Id. at 594, 175 A. at 69. Although it may be inferred that there was an oral brokerage
agreement, the court does not clearly explain the exact relationship between the broker and
the association.
41 Id. at 584, 590-91, 175 A. at 65, 67-68.
49 Id. at 586, 175 A. at 66.
50 Id. at 595, 175 A. at 70. Compare id. with Weinstein v. Clementsen, 20 N.J. Super. 367,
374, 90 A.2d 77, 80 (App. Div. 1952), where a distinction can be seen between this type of
activity and legitimate competitiveness.
51 113 N.J.L. at 595, 175 A. at 69-70. Although the owner of the property in this case
was a building and loan association, the defendant Julius Flink, in his capacities as a director,
president, and conservator of the association's property, appears to have had sufficient
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was not named in the suit; the court seems to have dealt with all
the defendants as third parties to the relationship between the
association and the broker, commenting that even though the
brokerage contract was void by reason of the statute of frauds, the
defendants, as "strangers to the agreement," could not raise the
statute as a defense.

52

In addition to actions based on interference with economic
advantage, brokers have successfully sued sellers on other tort
grounds where there has been no written brokerage agreement.
Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Wilson, 53 for example, concerned a seller
who had deceived his broker by not disclosing that another party
54
held a prior option on the real property being offered for sale.
The broker brought an action for his commission in contract and
in deceit.5 5 Reversing the trial court's dismissal of the action, the

supreme court held that, although the brokerage agreement was
oral and recovery on the contract was barred by the statute of
frauds, 56 the case would be remanded because the business loss
incurred by plaintiff due to defendant's allegedly deceitful representation stated an actionable claim.5 7 The court commented that
[t]he charge is not made to enforce the contents of the oral
the plaintiff for its loss engenagreement but to compensate
58
dered by the deceit.
It further indicated in dictum that in a proper case, where the
deceit "permeate[s] the contractual relationship between the parties," it would consider the possibility of overriding the statute of
frauds, thereby permitting contractual recovery in order to reach an
equitable result. 59 Thus, in Kamm and Schlesinger, despite the ab-

sence or the failure of the underlying contract, the brokers were
held to state an actionable claim because the defendants acted in a
power to manage that property and to act as agent in the sale of the association's real estate
assets. Id.
52 Id. at 591, 175 A. at 68. The court never expressly discussed section nine of the
statute, but since that is the only part of the statute of frauds pertaining to such real estate
brokerage agreements, it must be presumed that it was that section to which the court
referred.
53 22 N.J. 576, 127 A.2d 13 (1956).
.4 Id. at 578-79, 127 A.2d at 14-15.
55 Id. at 579, 127 A.2d at 15.
-1 Id. at 584, 127 A.2d at 18.
57 Id. at 586, 127 A.2d at 19.
-s Id. at 585, 127 A.2d at 18. The parties stipulated the damages for deceit to be $7,200,
but it should be noted that this figure was equivalent to what the plaintiff broker would have
received as his commission under the oral contract. See id. at 579-80, 127 A.2d at 14-15.
19 Id. at 584-85, 127 A.2d at 18.
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manner inimical to their general business relationship with the
60
brokers.
This theory of allowing recovery based on the misconduct of
the offending party applies in suits against the buyer as well.
McCue v. Deppert6 ' is representative of New Jersey cases6 2 brought
by brokers against buyers on the ground of tortious interference.
In McCue, the buyer had falsely represented in the contract of sale
that no broker had shown him the property.6 3 After completion of
the sale, the broker, who had an oral listing agreement with the
seller, brought an action against the buyer based on "unlawful
interference with plaintiffs business resulting in a deprivation of
prospective or potential economic advantage. ' 64 The appellate division, reversing a summary judgment for the defendant buyer
and remanding the cause to a jury,6 5 held that the purpose of the

statute of frauds is to protect the party to be charged, namely, the
seller, and that the buyer, who was not involved in that agreement,
could not rely on the unenforceability of the broker-seller contract
to shield him from liability.6

6

The court further held that the

broker need not even show he earned a commission; it was
sufficient to show that "except for the tortious interference by the
defendant . . . plaintiff would have consummated the sale and
made a profit. 6 7 Thus, where a buyer, who is not a party to the
6

The court in Schlesinger observed that the duty a broker traditionally owes to his

principal is not a "one-way street," and that the principal-agent relationship imposes a duty
of good faith on the seller as well as on the broker. Id. at 585, 127 A.2d at 18. See Sustick v.
Slatina, 48 N.J. Super. 134, 144, 137 A.2d 54, 60 (App. Div. 1957), where the court stated:
There can be no tighter test of liability in this area than that of the common
conception of what is right and just dealing under the circumstances. Not only must
defendants' motive and purpose be proper but so also must be the means.
Emphasis, however, is usually placed on the broker's fiduciary duty to his client. See, e.g.,
Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 552-53, 236 A.2d 843, 856 (1967); Carluccio
v. 607 Hudson St. Holding Co., 141 N.J. Eq. 449, 453-54, 57 A.2d 452, 454-55 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1948). NATIONAL ASS'N OF REAL ESTATE BOARDS, CODE OF ETHICS art. 11 (1962)
provides:
In accepting employment as an agent, the Realtor pledges himself to protect and
promote the interests of the client. This obligation of absolute fidelity to the client's
interest is primary, but it does not relieve the Realtor from the obligation of dealing
fairly with all parties to the transaction.
But see Comment, A Reexamination of the Real Estate Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship, 18 WAYNE
L. REV. 1343, 1343-44 (1972).
1 21 N.J. Super. 591, 91 A.2d 503 (App. Div. 1952).
62 See note 79 infra and accompanying text.
63
21 N.J. Super. at 594-95, 91 A.2d at 504-05.
64 Id.
at 595, 91 A.2d at 505.
65 Id.
at 598, 91 A.2d at 506.
66 Id.
at 596-97, 91 A.2d at 505-06.
67

Id.
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brokerage agreement, tortiously interferes with the broker's dealings, the court will place emphasis upon the broker's general business expectancy rather than upon the presence or absence of an
enforceable contract.
The extent to which the New Jersey courts have disregarded
the necessity of a contract in allowing recovery by a broker for
68
tortious conduct of a buyer is clearly exemplified in Harrisv. Perl.
In that case the court held that the broker could recover from the
buyer despite the absence not only of a formal brokerage contract,
but of any business relationship whatsoever with the seller. 6 9 The

buyer in Harris had been shown the property by the plaintiff
broker and had discussed price terms. The buyer subsequently
learned that the purported owner had transferred title to his bank
in satisfaction of a mortgage debt. 70 Plaintiff broker, however, was
unaware of this situation and believed the apparent owner had
authority to sell. 71 The buyer quickly made his offer directly to the
bank and promptly signed a contract of sale, representing therein
that no broker had shown him the property on behalf of the
bank. 72 The broker brought suit against the buyer on the ground
of tortious interference. 73 Although the facts indicated that plaintiff had neither a written contract with the purported seller nor
any business relationship with the actual seller, 74 the New Jersey
supreme court held that where a buyer deprives a broker of his
commission by dealing directly with the seller, thereby "appropriat68 41 N.J. 455, 197 A.2d 359 (1964).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.

at 464, 197 A.2d at 364.
at 458, 197 A.2d at 361.
at 459, 197 A.2d at 361.
at 460-61, 197 A.2d at 362. A representative of the buyer explained to the bank's

attorney that the Perls had previously been shown the property by someone, but did not
identify the plaintiff as that party. The result was that the standard clause wherein the buyer
represents to the seller that no broker was involved, was changed to read:
"The purchaser represents that at no time did any real estate broker show the
premises'to him on behalf of Union County Trust Company, the present owner, and so
far as he has knowledge, no one is entitled to be paid real estate commissions on
said sale."
Id. (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 459, 197 A.2d at 361. The opinion does not state the precise nature of the
plaintiff's claim against the buyer, but the language of the court implies that the action was
based on tortious interference with a reasonable expectancy of economic advantage. See id.at
460-63, 197 A.2d at 362-64.
Plaintiff also sued the bank and the purported seller. Id. at 459, 197 A.2d at 361. The
bank received summary judgment which was not appealed by the plaintiff, and the judgments of the lower courts in favor of the purported owner were affirmed by the supreme
court. Id. at 459, 466, 197 A.2d at 361, 365.
14 Id. at 458, 460, 197 A.2d at 361-62.
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ing to himself the value of the services of the broker, he should pay
for that mischief.

'7

The court reasoned that the buyer had deceit-

fully prevented the broker from learning of the involvement of the
bank, 76 and that, had the buyer fully infomed the bank of the
broker's interest, it most likely would have engaged her.77 Harris
thus stands for the proposition that even where the broker has
made no business contacts which would give rise to potential contractual benefits, the court will permit recovery for tortious interference with expectations of economic advantage where the offending buyer has breached fundamental tenets of "fair play."7 8
While most New Jersey cases dealing with this issue have
grounded a broker's recovery from a buyer on tort theories,7'7 the
supreme court, in the landmark case of Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v.
Johnson, ° has indicated that in a proper situation it will also base a
buyer's liability on a theory of implied contract. In that case the
broker had found a satisfactory property for a prospective buyer
who had solicited his services and who knew the broker would earn
a commission from the sale. Although the seller and the buyer had
agreed to the proposed terms of the sale, the buyer defaulted on
the contract."' The supreme court held that in such a situation the
law will imply a contract between the broker and the buyer, obligating the buyer to complete the transaction with the seller8 2 so that
Id. at 463, 197 A.2d at 364.
Id. at 464, 197 A.2d at 364. For a discussion of deceit as applied to broker-seller cases
see Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Wilson, 22 N.J. 576, 585-86, 127 A.2d 13, 18-19 (1956),
discussed in notes 53-59 supra.
77 41 N.J. at 460-61, 464, 197 A.2d at 362-64.
71 Id. at 464, 197 A.2d at 364.
79 See, e.g., Harris v. Perl, 41 N.J. 455, 197 A.2d 359 (1964); Myers v. Arcadio, Inc., 73
N.J. Super. 493, 180 A.2d 329 (App. Div. 1962); Sustick v. Slatina, 48 N.J. Super. 134, 137
A.2d 54 (App. Div. 1957); Geo. H. Beckmann, Inc. v. Charles H. Reid & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J.
Super. 159, 130 A.2d 48 (App. Div. 1957); McCue v. Deppert, 21 N.J. Super. 591, 91 A.2d
503 (App. Div. 1952); Fitt v. Schneidewind Realty Corp., 81 N.J. Super. 497, 180 A.2d 25 (L.
Div. 1963).
80 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967).
81 Id. at 534-43, 558, 236 A.2d at 846-50, 859. The supreme court considered it "a
matter of common knowledge" that a prospective buyer knows a broker will earn a commission from the sale. Id. at 558, 236 A.2d at 859.
12 Id. at 558-59, 236 A.2d at 859 (citing Tanner Associates, Inc. v. Ciraldo, 33 N.J.
51.
67-68, 161 A.2d 725, 734 (1960)).
A jury had found the buyer in Dobbs liable for the commission, but the judgment against
him was reversed by the appellate division. The supreme court reversed that judgment and
ordered a new trial based on the implied contract theory. 50 N.J. at 535, 562, 236 A.2d at
846, 861.
For an earlier -discussion of the broker-buyer-seller relationship see Harris v. Perl, 41
N.J. 455, 197 A.2d 359 (1964), where the court explained:
The role of the broker is to bring buyer and seller together at terms agreeable to
75
76

406
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the broker can receive his commission from the proceeds of the
sale. If the buyer breaches the contract with the seller without good
cause, he becomes liable to the broker for the commission based on
the breach of the implied contract.8 3 Although generally the
broker's commission is extracted from the proceeds of the sale, in
such a case of wrongful default by the buyer, the court will hold
him responsible for compensating a broker who has in all respects
84
done his job.
The cases above demonstrate that, with the exception of a
Dobbs-type contractual remedy, the general theory of recovery
against either seller or buyer, absent an enforceable brokerage
agreement, has focused upon the tortious conduct of the offending
party as the basis for compensating the broker for his lost commission. McCann restricts the extension of this tort theory of recovery.
As to seller liability, the court explained that at the root of any
claims by a broker for tortious interference there must necessarily
have occurred an injury to a contractual expectation cognizable
both, and both know the broker expects to earn a commission from the seller if he
succeeds. The broker's stock in trade is his knowledge of what property is or can be
made available and who is or can be interested in a given parcel. The inherent
uniqueness of each parcel distinguishes the real estate broker from the salesman of
automobiles or cutlery, for the very act of identifying real property or the prospective purchaser is itself both a rendition of a valuable service and an opportunity for
a dishonest man to make off with the broker's stock in trade.
Id. at 462-63, 197 A.2d at 363-64.
The major thrust of the holding in Dobbs, however, was the promulgation of a rule
precisely defining the point at which the seller becomes liable to the broker for his commission when a valid brokerage agreement exists:
When a broker is engaged by an owner of property to find a purchaser for it, the
broker earns his commission when (a) he produces a purchaser ready, willing and
able to buy on the terms fixed by the owner, (b) the purchaser enters into a binding
contract with the owner to do so, and (c) the purchaser completes the transaction by
closing the title in accordance with the provisions of the contract.
50 N.J. at 551, 236 A.2d at 855. If the buyer defaults, the seller is not liable for the
commission; but if the contract is not completed because of a "wrongful act or interference
of the seller," the seller must pay the commission. Id. Cf. Stanchak v. Cliffside Park Lodge
No. 1527 Loyal Order of Moose, Inc., 116 N.J. Super. 471, 479-81, 282 A.2d 775, 779-80
(App. Div. 1971), where the court held the seller liable even when a contract of sale had not
been executed. See generally Note, Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson: A Reexamination of the
Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship in New Jersey, 23 RUTGERs L. REV. 83 (1969).
s3 50 N.J. at 559, 236 A.2d at 859. The court further asserted that damages would be
equivalent to the lost commission, but if no percentage or specific amount had been
contracted for, recovery would be in quantum meruit. Id.
84 Id. at 558-59, 236 A.2d at 859. The buyer's implied contract with the broker in such a
case is independent of the buyer's contract with the seller; thus, it is irrelevant whether or
not the seller sues the buyer for breach-the broker may still seek his commission from the
buyer. Id. at 556-57, 560, 236 A.2d at 858, 860. An exception to this general principle would
occur when the seller successfully sues the buyer for a "substantial" sum. In this case, the
seller is said to have received "payment representing the equivalent of performance," and
would be liable for the commission. Id. at 557-58, 236 A.2d at 858-59.
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under the statute of frauds. In the case of a contract rendered void
and unenforceable because of noncompliance with the statute of
5
frauds, a broker cannot avoid the statute by suing in tort.8
The court further asserted that the statute of frauds was
enacted primarily to protect the seller, and it stressed the importance of placing the risk of loss on the broker.8 6 Adopting language
of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the court noted that
"[b]rokers are professionals; it is not unfair to deprive them of compensation ifthey do not adopt the safeguards of which they should be aware."'

Although the McCann court effectively limited the circumstances under which a broker may recover on tortious interference grounds, it did distinguish cases which had permitted the
broker to recover in tort against the seller."' It reasoned that these
cases involved "peculiar factual and legal situations" beyond the
ambit of the issues presented in McCann."' For example, its analysis
of Schlesinger specifically denominated the action there as one based
on deceit, implying that the holding should be narrowly applied
and would be inapposite to cases such as McCann where there was
no evidence or allegation of deceit. 90 Another case, Brenner & Co.
v. Perl,9 ' serves to underscore the McCann court's concern with the
85 65 N.J. at 310, 322 A.2d at 165-66. But see Sustick v. Slatina, 48 N.J. Super. 134, 137
A.2d 54 (App. Div. 1957), where the facts were similar to those in McCann, but the seller did
not plead the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense. The appellate division sustained
the judgment of the trial court against both sellers and buyers. Since the statute was not
pleaded, the court could, as a matter of law, treat the brokerage agreement as valid and
proceed unhampered by the restrictions of the statute. Id. at 138-41, 137 A.2d at 56-58.
Discussing the liability of the seller in this case, the Slatina court stated:
He knew plaintiff had a prospective purchaser, he promised him a commission,
learned the name and address of the purchasers from him, but then acted in
concert with the Slatinas for the purpose of profiting by the elimination of plaintiff's commission, without giving plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to bring the
parties together at a mutually satisfactory price.
Id. at 145, 137 A.2d at 60.
88 See 65 N.J. at 308-10, 322 A.2d at 165.
87 Id. at 310, 322 A.2d at 165 (quoting from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 468,

comment b, at 399 (1958)) (emphasis by court). For additional text of that portion of the
Restatement quoted by the court see note 22 supra.
88 65 N.J. at 310-11, 322 A.2d at 166.
89 Id. at 310, 322 A.2d at 166.
90 Id. at 311, 322 A.2d at 166. The court in Schlesinger stated the following elements as
necessary for an action in deceit:
[A] false representation, knowledge or belief by the defendant of the falsity, an
intention that the plaintiff act thereon, reasonable reliance/in acting thereon by
plaintiff, and resultant damage.
22 N.J. at 585-86, 127 A.2d at 18. None of these elements was specifically found in McCann.
91 72 N.J. Super. 160, 178 A.2d 19 (App. Div. 1962). This was an appeal by the broker
of a summary judgment in favor of the seller. Id. at 162, 178 A.2d at 20.
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need for an underlying business expectation on the part of the
broker based on a judicially enforceable contract. In Brenner, the
broker was allowed to bring an action for recovery of his commission from a seller where, during the term of a valid listing agreement, there was an "unmistakable inference" that the sellers had
induced the buyers to withhold their offer until the listing agreement expired, thus depriving the broker of his commission.9" Although there could be no recovery on the expired contract, 93 the
writing was evidence of a valid business expectation. As such, any
wrongful interference with that expectation was deemed an action94
able tort.
It should be noted that Kamm was not discussed in the opinion
in McCann, and was relied on solely for the premise that in "appropriate real estate brokerage matters" a claim for tort will lie. 95
While the McCann court viewed Kamm as the case authority for the
general validity of such tortious interference actions, it apparently
did not deem it necessary to reconcile the two cases. 96 Indeed, like
Schlesinger and Brenner, Kamm serves to illustrate situations in which
the application of the statute of frauds is deemed inappropriate.
As to buyer liability, the McCann court rejected the plaintiffs
contention that the implied contract theory enunciated in Dobbs
could be applied against the buyers.9 7 Distinguishing that case, it
92 Id. at 166, 178 A.2d at 22. The defendant had notified the plaintiff that he was going
to advertise the house himself, whereupon the plaintiff sent him a list of persons who had
been shown the house by plaintiffs personnel. He informed the defendant that he expected
a six percent commission if the house were sold to any one of those persons. The name of
the subsequent purchasers appeared on that list. In addition, the purchasers told the
defendant that they had been there with the plaintiff's agent. Id. at 164-65, 178 A.2d at 21.
93 Id. at 165-66, 178 A.2d at 22.
" The Brenner court did not state that its reasoning was based on interference with a
business expectancy; but this may be inferred from its reliance on Louis Schlesinger Co. v.
Rice, 4 N.J. 169, 179-82, 72 A.2d 197, 202-03 (1950), where the decision was couched largely
in terms of malicious interference with the plaintiff broker's contract by the owner and
another broker. See 72 N.J. Super. at 167-68, 178 A.2d at 22-23. Compare 4 N.J. at 179-82, 72
A.2d at 202-03 with Louis Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 113 N.J.L. 582, 175 A. 62 (Ct. Err. & App.
1934), discussed in notes 42-52 supra and accompanying text.
65 N.J. at 303, 322 A.2d at 162.
Although the issues in Kamm and McCann may appear alike, the circumstances
surrounding the real estate transactions in the two cases were quite different. Specifically, all
of the parties in Kamm were professionals who were familiar with real estate transactions. In
addition, the conduct of the defendants in Kamm was alleged to have been particularly
offensive. See 113 N.J.L. at 595, 175 A. at 69-70. Most important, all of the defendants in
that case were viewed as strangers to the brokerage agreement, thus eliminating the need for
a consideration of the effect of section nine. See note 52 supra and accompanying text. In
McCann, only the plaintiff was a professional; the conduct of the defendants was not seen as
being especially egregious, and the statute of frauds was the focal point of the litigation.
97 65 N.J. at 312-13, 322 A.2d at 167.
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noted that Dobbs involved a valid brokerage agreement, a contract
of sale effectuated by the broker, and default by the buyer. In
contrast, these circumstances were absent in McCann and the seller
was not legally bound to use or pay the broker. The court reasoned
that the mere fact that the broker could not legally collect his
commission from the seller did not in itself imply a promise to pay
it by the buyer.98
In addition to its discussion of the implied contract approach
to buyer liability, the court expressly endorsed cases holding a
buyer liable in tort where his interference caused the broker to
be excluded from the transaction and resulted in a wrongful
pecuniary advantage to himself equivalent to the lost commission.99
From those cases can be derived the proposition that the more
closely the alleged advantage to the buyer approaches the amount
of the broker's lost prospective commission, the more likely is the
inference that the broker was excluded in order to reduce the
purchase price by the amount of the commission.' 0 To negative
that inference a defendant buyer would contend that he gained
nothing by excluding the broker because he would not have paid a
higher price and the seller would not have accepted less. Such was
the argument propounded by the buyers in Harris,0t ' but there the
court held that they could not "avoid real damages by raising an
issue made hypothetical by [their] very wrong."'1 2 In McCann, the
court was satisfied that the buyers did not gain a pecuniary advantage corresponding to the commission and that had a different
price been demanded by either party "there would have been no
deal.'

03

It appears from this language that, even if the conduct of

91 Id. The court commented that to hold the buyer liable under that theory would be a
"grossly onerous and unfair obligation ... absent an express agreement between buyer and
broker to that effect." Id. at 313, 322 A.2d at 167.
11 Id. at 313 n.4, 322 A.2d at 167.
100 Such a situation was before the court in Sustick v. Slatina, 48 N.J. Super. 134, 137
A.2d 54 (App. Div. 1957), where the court noted that by comparing the ultimate net sale
price with the original asking price the jury could have found that the plaintiff was
deliberately excluded "so that the payment of a broker's commission might be eliminated."
Id. at 143, 137 A.2d at 59. The situation may be inferred from the facts in Harris v. Perl, 41
N.J. 455, 458-59, 197 A.2d 359, 361 (1964) (buyer deliberately avoided contact with plaintiff
broker, sending his hurried offer directly to the seller), and McCue v. Deppert, 21 N.J.
Super. 591, 594-95, 91 A.2d 503, 504-05 (App. Div. 1952) (price lowered because buyer
falsely told seller no broker was involved).
101 41 N.J. at 464-65, 197 A.2d at 364-65.
102 Id. at 465, 197 A.2d at 365.
103 65 N.J. at 308, 322 A.2d at 164. The court stated emphatically:
[T]his is not the usual case where a seller and buyer deal directly, despite the
presence of a broker in the situation, and agree on a price which represents the
seller's figure less commission.
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the buyers had been in issue on appeal,1 0 4 the court would have
decided in their favor.
By carefully distinguishing prior cases and by couching its
holding in terms of a "general proposition,"'' 0 5 McCann allows for
flexibility so that in future similar cases, the statute of frauds will
not stand as an absolute bar to equitable considerations.10 6 Notwithstanding this potential flexibility, it is clear that the scope of
t 7
seller liability has been significantly narrowed.
The position of the court concerning buyer liability is not as
well-defined. One of the explanations presented by the McCann
court to distinguish Dobbs was the existence of a valid brokerage
agreement in the latter case.' 08 The court's treatment of this issue
implies that the existence of a valid brokerage agreement is a
precondition to an implied buyer-broker contract.' 0 9 The Dobbs
opinion, however, appears to impose no such requirement.'"
Id. at 307-08, 322 A.2d at 164. This raises the question of whether the McCann court would
have reversed the judgment in favor of the buyers if the pecuniary advantage had, by
chance, corresponded to the amount of the expected commission. It should be noted,
however, that because of the contradictory nature of the evidence, it is difficult to determine
just how much money was saved by the exclusion of the broker. Apparently deeming Harris'
rationale inapplicable, the supreme court in McCann declared that no pecuniary advantage
was gained because "the sellers received the lowest net figure they were willing to accept and
the buyers paid the highest price they would agree to." Id. at 308, 322 A.2d at 164. Compare
id. with note 102 supra and accompanying text.
104 No appeal was taken from the judgment in favor of the buyers on the tort theory. 65
N.J. at 308 n.3, 322 A.2d at 164.
105 Id. at 310, 322 A.2d at 165-66.
106 The supreme court has indicated that in a proper case equitable principles may
temper the strict application of the statute of frauds. See note 59 supra and accompanying
text.
107 It might appear that the seller could be required to pay the broker indirectly-in a
suit by a buyer for contribution as a joint tortfeasor. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW

OF

TORTS §§ 49-52 (4th ed. 1971). But New Jersey's Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law [N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-1 etseq. (1952)] has been construed to prohibit an action for contribution from a party against whom the injured person had no cause of action. See, e.g.,
Sattelberger v. Telep, 14 N.J. 353, 367, 102 A.2d 577, 584 (1954). Thus, in a case where a
broker has no cause of action against a seller insulated by the statute of frauds, it is unlikely
that a buyer could successfully sue the seller for contribution even though the seller may
have acted in concert with the buyer to deprive the broker of his commission.
108 65 N.J. at 312, 322 A.2d at 167. See 50 N.J. at 538-39, 236 A.2d at 848.
10965 N.J. at 312, 322 A.2d at 167. The court, noting that in Dobbs there was a valid
brokerage agreement, a contract of sale with a buyer produced by the broker, and default by
that buyer, stated that "under such circumstances" a buyer-broker contract would be implied.
Id. (emphasis added).
It is interesting to note that the plaintiff in McCann attempted to establish additional
liability against the sellers by alleging that they had induced the buyers to breach their
implied contract with her. The court, having found no implied contract to breach, rejected
the theory. Id. at 313 n.5, 322 A.2d at 167.
"' There, it was said that an implied contract existed
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Thus, it is not clear whether the court is simply restating the facts
of Dobbs in order to distinguish them from the facts of McCann, or
whether it is distilling from Dobbs a rule that even in an implied
contract action, a written brokerage agreement is needed as evidence of an enforceable contractual expectancy."'
Another issue left unsettled in McCann is the degree of pecuniary advantage which must accrue to the buyer in order to give
rise to the presumption that the buyer dealt directly with the seller
solely to deprive the broker of his commission. While McCann
implies that to hold the buyer liable in such a case the pecuniary
advantage must correspond to the commission," 2 no clear standard has been promulgated. Thus, pecuniary advantage, while it
may serve as a useful indicator of buyer misconduct, cannot be
viewed as a clear-cut test.
McCann v. Biss serves to warn real estate brokers and attorneys
that a broker's suit against a seller for tortious interference with a
prospective economic advantage will probably not be successful if
the broker-seller agreement has not been reduced to a writing in
conformance with the statute of frauds." 3 The McCann court has
when a prospective buyer solicits a broker to find or to show him property which he
might be interested in buying, and the broker finds property satisfactory to him
which the owner agrees to sell at the price offered, and the buyer knows the broker
will earn commission for the sale from the owner ....
50 N.J. at 559, 236 A.2d at 859.
" This ambiguity raises the question: How would the McCann court decide a case
identical to Dobbs in all respects, except for the existence of a written brokerage agreement?
Since the court in McCann places so much emphasis on the broker's duty as a professional to
obtain a written brokerage agreement upon which to base his business expectancy, it is
probable that, were such a case to arise, the court would not hold the buyer liable, even
though, as a stranger to the agreement, he could not raise the statute of frauds as a defense.
"I See 65 N.J. at 313 n.4, 322 A.2d at 167.
"3
The National Association of Real Estate Boards has reflected a concern with the
need for written brokerage agreements in its code:
The Realtor, for the protection of all parties with whom he deals, should see that
financial obligations and commitments regarding real estate transactions are in
writing, expressing the exact agreement of the parties; and that copies of such
agreements, at the time they are executed, are placed in the hands of all parties
involved.
NATIONAL ASS'N OF REAL ESTATE BOARDS, CODE OF ETHics art. 10 (1962). Conspicuously

absent from the code, however, is any suggestion to the broker that a major reason for
obtaining a written brokerage agreement is to protect himself.
The New Jersey Real Estate Commission currently lacks sufficient funds to enable it to
apprise real estate brokers of recent developments such as the holding in McCann. It is
expected, though, that when funds become available, the Commission will institute a system
of dissemination of such information. Letter from John J. Regan, Secretary-Director of the
New Jersey Real Estate Commission, to author, Dec. 24, 1974, on file at Seton Hall Law
Review.
At least one local realty organization has informed its members of the McCann decision.
See Lasser, Realty News in the Courts, THE REALTOR, Oct. 1974, at 3-5 (The Realtor is a monthly
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not changed the law but has attempted to clarify the decisions in
this area, and by its forceful reaffirmation ofthe statute of frauds,
has taken the holding in Snyder one step further. In addition to
Snyder's refusal to allow recovery for interference with an unenforceable brokerage agreement, 1 4 McCann now precludes a broker
from recovering under the more general theory of interference
with a prospective economic advantage, since the court will look
beyond that claim for an underlying contractual expectation.
The McCann decision further insulates the real estate seller
from liability and rejects a theory which would make the buyer a
guarantor of the broker's commission. While brokers may view this
as unduly restrictive, they need only comply with the provisions
of section nine of the New Jersey statute of frauds in order fully to
protect themselves.
Edmond M. Konin
publication of the Real Estate Board of Newark, Irvington, and northern Hillside, New
Jersey). After reviewing the facts and holding in McCann, the author stated:
In the absence of a written brokerage commission agreement, the broker was thus
in a position where it could not prevent the buyer and the seller from concluding
the sale transaction, leaving out the broker.
The conclusion and the moral is [sic] obvious.
Id. at 5. For the above author's earlier comments on the statute of frauds see note 28 supra.
"
See notes 32-41 supra and accompanying text. The McCann court stated that its
holding was "dictated and was foreshadowed" by its earlier opinion in Snyder. 65 N.J. at 310,
322 A.2d at 166.

